

ORIGIN ACTION

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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A-948

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

1963 JAN 8 AM 11 57

INFO : LONDON \_\_\_\_\_, COMUS/J \_\_\_\_\_, GINGPAC \_\_\_\_\_,  
GINGPACFLT \_\_\_\_\_, CINCUSARPAC \_\_\_\_\_, GINGPACAT \_\_\_\_\_

Department Pass: CNO, SA, COMSAT, SECDEF, JSC, CIA

FROM : AmEmbassy TOKYO

DATE: January 4, 1963

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 1

REF :

CONTENTS

1. Opinion Polls Show Increased Support for Ikeda Cabinet
2. Agreement Reached on GOJ Aid Level for Okinawa
3. Maritime Self Defense Force Officers Get Preview of Tartar Destroyer

POLITICAL1. Opinion Polls Show Increased Support for Ikeda Cabinet

Results of Kyodo and Jiji opinion polls conducted early December show rise in support for Ikeda Cabinet and Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP). Kyodo poll indicated 34.2 per cent favoring continuation Ikeda Cabinet as compared with 28.7 in June, 1962; Jiji showed Ikeda Cabinet support up to 42.3 per cent from 36.7 in November. Kyodo indicated 43.2 per cent supporting LDP, while Jiji showed rise in LDP support from 34.5 per cent in November to 40.7. According to Jiji poll, 21 per cent (25.8 in Kyodo survey) of respondents supported Socialist Party (JSP), with 1.6 per cent (3.2 in Kyodo) supporting Democratic Socialists.

Other interesting portions of Jiji poll showed 45.6 per cent believing Japan should align itself with Free World, with 0.5 for Communist camp and 27.4 per cent for neutral stand. Although 42.5 per cent considered solution of problems with ROK to be "very important" matter, only 37.7 per cent agreed that ROK-Japan talks should be pushed "positively," as compared with 43.5 per cent in previous month. Better than two-thirds of Jiji poll respondents indicated awareness of Indo-

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Clearances:

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Tokyo

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ChiCom border dispute, but of this group only 29.7 considered incident of world-wide importance. Of same group, 0.9 per cent believed ChiCom side to be right, 16.5 per cent chose Indian side, with 7.3 critical of both; 42.8 per cent, however, did not know which side in right. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: Since both polls taken just prior to extraordinary Diet session (WEEK 52, Item 1), results do not reflect reaction to it, which probably hurt JSP more than LDP. Rise in support for Ikeda Cabinet, therefore, probably reflects success Prime Minister's European visit, and doubtless this increase in popularity was bolstered by events at extraordinary Diet session. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

2. Agreement Reached on GOJ Aid Level for Okinawa

Agreement reached with GOJ on December 28 that Japanese aid for Okinawa during JFY 63 (April 1, 1963 - March 31, 1964) would total \$5.1 million. Negotiating sessions were attended by representative of US High Commissioner of Ryukyu Islands (HICOM). GOJ agreed to HICOM-suggested revisions and deletions in its proposed program and has indicated willingness to reallocate funds available as a result of these changes to projects where HICOM suggested greater Japanese expenditure than original GOJ program provided. Final list of projects and project details are expected to be settled in further negotiations beginning on or about January 10. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

Comment: \$5.1 million dollar aid program marks substantial increase over \$2.9 million in aid funds which GOJ providing Okinawa during current JFY. GOJ was insistent that this was minimum amount which would meet its domestic political requirements. GOJ showed considerable flexibility, however, on utilization funds. Acceptance of GOJ figure by US avoided repetition last year's experience when US was accused of placing severe limits on Japanese aid. Press now seems to take US-Japanese cooperation in rendering aid to Okinawa as accomplished fact, with Finance Ministry, rather than US, increasingly identified as controlling force on amount of Japanese aid to Ryukyus. (CONFIDENTIAL)

MILITARY  
Navy

3. Maritime Self Defense Force Officers Get Preview of Tartar Destroyer

On January 2, twenty-two senior officers of Maritime Self Defense Force, headed by Adm NAKAYAMA, Chief, Maritime Staff, inspected USS Robison (DDG-12), Tartar missile destroyer, at Yokosuka Naval Base. Purpose of visit was to give senior MSDF officers first view of ship similar to new 3,000-ton MSDF Tartar ship Amatsukaze (keel laid November 24 at Mitsubishi Nagasaki). It

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expected that Amatsukaze (DDC) will be launched October 1963 and commissioned February 1965. Twenty-eight MSDF officers presently receiving Tartar training in U.S. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Comment: Amatsukaze will be first modern weapons ship for MSDF. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

For the Ambassador:



David L. Osborn  
First Secretary of Embassy

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(Item 3)

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NavAtt:LtColRBCrossman  
ArmAtt:MajLRHillman  
AirAtt:LtColRHGrubb

*701*  
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# AIRGRAM

794.00(w) / 1-1163

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PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

A-983

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PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

033 JAN 14 AM 11 15

INFO : LONDON \_\_\_\_\_, COMUS/J \_\_\_\_\_, CINCSPAC \_\_\_\_\_,  
CINCPACFLT \_\_\_\_\_, CINCUSARPAC \_\_\_\_\_, CINCPACAF \_\_\_\_\_

Department Pass: CNO, SA, COMSEC, SECDEF, JSC, CIA

FROM : AmEmbassy TOKYO

DATE: January 11, 1963

SUBJECT : JOINT WEEKA NO. 2

REF  
NAVY for CND-1  
APR for COFSAF-1  
ARMY for SA-1  
OSD for SECDEF-1  
OSD for JSC-1

1. Further JCP Reaction to Sino-Soviet Dispute
2. Ozawa Appointed Postal Minister Following Teshima Resignation
3. Japan-ROK Relations
4. Possible High-level JDA/SDF Personnel Changes.

## POLITICAL

## 1. Further JCP Reaction to Sino-Soviet Dispute

Japan Communist Party (JCP) continues give spotty, ostensibly non-committal coverage to Sino-Soviet dispute (WESKA 51, Item 2). Akahata on January 3 filled entire second page with summaries of: (1) People's Daily editorial of December 31: "Our Differences With Comrade Togliatti"; (2) TOGLIATTI's speech at 10th ICP Congress; and (3) speech by Indonesian CP Chairman AIDIT characterizing current "differences of opinion" as "temporary phenomenon" and calling for world congress to settle differences, as well as full text of KHRUSHCHEV-MAO exchange of New Year's greetings, under heading: "Strengthening Brotherly Ties"; Pravda January 7 editorial carried on January 9, together with TONA re-print of Norwegian CP editorial of December 20: "On Relations Between Various Parties". No Akahata comment either occasion and no other coverage of Sino-Soviet differences. January 9 edition had signed article by Deputy Chief JCP United Front Department condemning revisionism and revisionist interpretation of peaceful coexistence as "one people" who advocate abandonment of class struggle and reconciliation

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of socialism-imperialism. Article, however, purportedly directed toward right-leaning Japan Socialist Party, and on balance Akahata still retains superficially neutral pose. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: JCP is controlled by predominantly pro-Chinese element and unable take Soviet side without capitulating to its domestic ideological opponents (such as dissident Communist wing of Shojiro KASUGA) or ~~XX~~ accepting possibility of "coexistence" with Japan's ruling classes (i.e., structural reform). At same time, JCP is aware that overt identification as Chicom tool or as advocate of reckless extremism would hurt it domestically in current Japanese atmosphere of political moderation. This leaves as poor but least damaging alternative current policy of (1) deploring existence of dispute and urging prompt settlement, while (?) resisting pressures otherwise to comment on issue or identify with either side. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

## 2. Ozawa Appointed Postal Minister Following Teshima Resignation

Prime Minister Ikeda installed LDP Upper House member Kyutaro OZAWA as new Postal Services Minister on January 8, following resignation of Sakae TESHIMA on January 7 for reason ill-health. Sixty-three year-old Ozawa, Chairman of Upper House Steering Committee, has been in Diet since 1953 after 26 years as bureaucrat. During first press conference Ozawa announced intent to expedite joint Japan-US space communications projects now in budget. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: New Postal Minister is well-liked but unspectacular member of Sato faction (with personal ties also to Shojiro KAWASHIMA) and backed for post by Upper House leadership. Selection appears routine personnel move, based on internal party considerations rather than any particular qualifications of Ozawa for job. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

## 3. Japan-RCK Relations

FonOff NEA Section Chief MAEDA and Economic Cooperation Section Chief SAWAKI left for Korea January 11 for fact-finding and orientation trip. LDP Vice President OHNO January 9 expressed confidence normalization treaty would be signed by early April. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: There is serious concern re prospects for successful fisheries negotiations. However, on working level preparation for normalization relations going ahead and on political level LDP public relations committee has initiated TV and speaking program designed enlist public approval for normalization agreement. (UNCLASSIFIED)

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MILITARY

Army

4. Possible High-level JDA/SDF Personnel Changes

Increased speculation in Japan Defense Agency (JDA) circles and press, as well as conversations by service attache officers with JDA and Self Defense Force (SDF) officials all point to possibility of changes within next 90 days in certain high-level positions in JDA and SDF. Current speculation is that: (1) JDA Administrative Vice Minister Muneo TOGA will retire to be replaced by Chief, JDA Secretariat Yozo KATO; (2) Chairman, Joint Staff Council General Keizo HAYASHI will replace Dr. Tomoo MAKI, Superintendent, Defense Academy, who expected retire soon; (3) Admiral Sadayoshi NAKAYAMA, Chief, Maritime Staff, and General Kan OHMORI, Chief of Staff, Ground SDF, both likely candidates to succeed Gen Hayashi, with edge generally given OHMORI. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: Changes, if made, not likely have significant effect on JDA/SDF leadership or Japan's defense policies. TCGA has completed normal two-year tour for vice minister and there have been some rumors of personality differences with JDA Dir Gen SHIGA. KATO is capable and competent career official and should provide experience and moderation to energetic and impatient Dir Gen Shiga. General HAYASHI would be excellent as head of Defense Academy and should enhance its prestige. General OHMORI, if selected, would bring relatively long experience in current Japanese military problems to position of Chairman, JSC, but has neither social aplomb nor diplomatic flair of HAYASHI. Admiral NAKAYAMA, as outstanding professional naval officer, is probably choice of uniformed professional leadership of three services for position of Chairman, JSC. (CONFIDENTIAL)

For the Ambassador:



David L. Osborn

First Secretary of Embassy

TPSho:Smith:mjc  
WLGivens

PCJ:JGoodyear

ArmAtt:MajRHBeck  
(Item 4)

USIS:IIzenberg  
NavAtt:LtColRBCrossman  
ArmAtt:MajRHBeck  
AirAtt:MajAFErwin

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ORIGIN/SECTION

INR-10

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

# AIRGRAM

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A-1056

NO.

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : LONDON \_\_\_\_\_, COMUS/J \_\_\_\_\_, CINCPAC \_\_\_\_\_,  
CINCPACFLT \_\_\_\_\_, CINCUSARPAC \_\_\_\_\_, CINCPACAF \_\_\_\_\_

Department Pass: CNO, SA, COFSAP, ~~SECDEF~~, JSC, CIA

FROM : AmEmbassy TOKYO

DATE: January 25, 1963

SUBJECT: JOINT WEEKA NO. 4

- REF: please pass - Navy SecGen No. 1056  
Army for SA: Army for Col. 1056
- Contents**
1. Resumed Diet Session
  2. ROK-Japan Relations
  3. Demonstrations Staged Against ROK-Japan Talks
  4. Zenro Convention
  5. Settlement of Major Labor Dispute in Chemical Industry
  6. MSDF Training Squadron May Visit NATO Nations
  7. Use of Japanese Ports by Nuclear Submarines

## POLITICAL

### 1. Resumed Diet Session

After week of inter-party negotiations on "normalization," resumed regular Diet session (WEEKA 3, Item 1) was formally opened on January 23. Following customary policy addresses by Prime Minister and Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Finance, plenary session interpellations commenced on January 25. JSP SecGen NARITA led off with sharp questions designed to exploit recent developments in Korea in attacking Japan-Korea normalization talks. (Item 3), as well as expected questions on coal policy. (UNCLASSIFIED)

**Comment:** PriMin's policy address sustained note of self-confidence and stress on Japan's world responsibilities that has characterized his public statements since his return from Europe. Despite customary criticisms of its lack of "freshness" and "concreteness," reaction to

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speech generally favorable. Although indications of higher posture on part of PriMin and LDP have been noted in press, disclosure that GOJ will not introduce controversial education reform bill at this session shows that Ikeda has not abandoned basic posture of avoiding divisive debate as much as possible. Thus major possibility of trouble in Diet still centers on Japan-Korea talks--if, indeed, settlement is concluded during session. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

2. ROK-Japan Relations

Japanese government and business community watching developments in ROK very closely with considerable apprehension that present ROK domestic crisis may adversely affect progress normalization talks. NEA Section Chief MAEDA, who returned from nine-day visit to Seoul just prior current crisis, expressed to Embassy officer guarded optimism re future relations with ROK, but was disappointed that ROK negotiators had given no indications flexibility fisheries position. Next meeting ROK-Japan talks January 28. (CONFIDENTIAL)

Comment: Would seem likely both sides will mark time until situation in ROK clarifies. (CONFIDENTIAL)

3. Demonstrations Staged Against ROK-Japan Talks

Rallies and demonstrations demanding immediate suspension ROK-Japan talks held various locations throughout Japan January 21-24 under sponsorship People's Council to Oppose Security Treaty and Safeguard Peace and Democracy (WEEKA 3, Item 2), with Tokyo rally January 24 drawing estimated 7,000 followed by demonstration parade of approximately 11,000 persons. According police estimates, as of January 23 demonstrations and rallies at 125 locations throughout Japan had attracted approximately 42,000 persons. JSP Central Committee (CC) delegates attended Tokyo rally following CC meeting at which SecGen NARITA reportedly called for mass campaign against ROK-Japan talks on same scale as 1960 anti-Security Treaty demonstrations. Leaders of movement undoubtedly intend exploit current ROK political crisis in demanding immediate suspension talks. (Item 1). (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Tokyo rally and demonstration apparently achieved somewhat larger turn-out than similar efforts made latter part 1962, but those elsewhere evidently less successful. Principal objective, however, is to build-up momentum this campaign in hope make major drive in spring when agreement on normalization may be ready for submission to Diet and when campaign can be tied in with offensive on labor front. (LIMITED OFFICIAL USE)

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#### 4. Zenro Convention

Annual Zenro convention met January 17-19, reelected President TAKITA and Secretary General WADA, adopted action policy, and made changes in Zenro by-laws designed to establish closer relations between national headquarters and prefectural chapters. Highlight of convention was adoption of new wage policy which calls for: insistence upon increase in "labor's share," doubling of wages in seven years, adoption of wage structure based on job classifications, and ¥400 daily minimum wage. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: In contrast with Zenro's past formula which tailored and timed wage demands to management's capacity to pay, this year's wage policy is broader based and more militant. This may reflect Zenro's design to compete more aggressively with Sohyo's recent emphasis on economic gains and, at same time, to satisfy pressures coming from more militant elements inside two of Zenro's mainstay affiliates, Textile Workers and Electric Power Workers Unions. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

#### 5. Settlement of Major Labor Dispute in Chemical Industry

Six-month old strike and lockout at Minamata (Kumamoto Prefecture) plant of Shin Nippon Chisso Hiryo (Nitrogenous Fertilizer) settled in third week of January when company and union (affiliate of Synthetic Chemical Workers Union -- Goka Roren) accepted a mediation plan proposed by Kumamoto Labor Relations Commission (KLRC). At heart of dispute were issues of significance to entire chemical fertilizer industry: management's demand for and union's opposition to a long-term wage settlement ("wage stabilization plan") and reduction in work force. KLRC's plan disposed these issues in following manner: (a) a three-year wage formula granting ¥2600 average monthly wage increase for 1962, ¥500 more than average increase of six highest paying fertilizer companies in 1963, and wage arbitration, if necessary, by KLRC in 1964; (b) company is to call for "voluntary resignations"; (c) "automatic resignation" of two union leaders; and (d) litigation of cases those employees who are charged with responsibility for strike and illegal acts. (UNCLASSIFIED)

Comment: Settlement reflects close to total victory for company, as well as foreshadowing for weakened Goka Roren types of settlements it may have to accept in its dealings with other major producers of chemical fertilizers. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

#### MILITARY

##### Navy

#### 6. MSDF Training Squadron May Visit NATO Nations

Local newspapers, January 22, reported that Maritime Self Defense Force

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Training Squadron would visit NATO nations on 127-day training cruise, leaving Tokyo late June. MSDF plan for this year's training cruise originally called for visits to US and Canada, but according to press reports Prime Minister IKEDA at January 17 meeting with Defense Agency Director General Kenjiro SHIGA and Chiefs of Maritime, Ground, and Air Staffs (WEEKA 3, Item 2) expressed desire that cruise go to NATO countries.

Press reports not yet officially confirmed, but Maritime Staff Office (MSO) source unofficially confirmed to ALUSNA that NATO cruise for this year only in planning stage. Same source indicated that Training Squadron visit to Europe this year depends on availability funds, which not at present in JFY 64 MSDF budget. Source stated that MSO skeptical re possibility NATO visit, feeling that when increased budget requirements are presented, "politicians will not buy it." Foreign Office source felt that chances of NATO visit were "1 in 100". (CONFIDENTIAL)


Comment: Information was apparently leaked to press, irking MSO. NATO visit obviously PriMin's idea resulting from his 1962 visit to Europe and may well be designed to add to Japan's prestige in NATO countries and to re-emphasize in Japan existence of strong ties with Europe, as well as US. (CONFIDENTIAL)

7. Use of Japanese Ports by Nuclear Submarines

Japanese press, January 24-25, carried report of US negotiations with GOJ for admission of nuclear-powered submarines (SSN) into Japanese ports, but with only pro-government Tokyo Shimbun giving lead play. Story apparently leaked to press by GOJ as trial balloon, and some papers cited Chief Cabinet Secretary KUROGANE as source. Reports pointed up that SSN's would be of "Nautilus" type, not Polaris missile subs. Stories further stated US had SSN's in Pacific Fleet and wanted use Japanese ports for "resting" crews and resupply; also pointed out GOJ refusal during 1961 to permit entry. Socialist Party statement opposing entry and threatening demonstrations also was reported January 25. OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Comment: Initial media reaction appeared mild and factual, with some comment that it may be difficult for GOJ to again refuse entry of SSN's. (OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

For the Ambassador:



David L. Osborn

First Secretary of Embassy

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JMFarrior

POL:JGoodyear

LabAtt:LSilverberg  
(Items 4 & 5)  
Military  
(Items 6 & 7)

USIS:IIzenberg  
NavAtt:LtColRBCrossman  
ArmAtt:MajLRHillman

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